Ever since Plato, philosophers have wondered what knowledge is. 'Belief' is necessary, but it's not sufficient. 'True belief' is necessary, but insufficient as well, because it doesn't rule out epistemic luck. But as Gettier demonstrated, even 'justified true belief' doesn't rule out all conceivable cases of epistemic luck. So how should we analyze knowledge?

Is knowledge attainable in the first place? Is knowledge within human reach? Shouldn't we be able to rule out all alternatives to know something? Or does 'enough is enough; it doesn't mean everything' apply? And if so, how does it warrant the possibility of knowledge?

Is knowledge a pyramid, built on a large, solid foundation? Or rather a raft, with beams of wood that more or less hang together but can get adrift at sea? Or still, is it a crossword puzzle, which is not only solved by interpreting clues, but also by fitting coherently with the other words?

Some methods to produce beliefs, such as guessing or wishful thinking, are unreliable; more often than not, they produce false beliefs. By contrast, other methods to produce beliefs, such as perception, are reliable; they produce more true beliefs than false ones. In this module, we'll wonder whether being reliable produced in this sense suffices for a belief to be justified.

Knowledge can help to solve problems. But what role can philosophical knowledge, and more specifically epistemological knowledge, play in solving real world problems, like, e.g., truth decay? This final module discusses the heuristic and conceptual functions of epistemology, and the pivotal importance of 'contexts' in that respect.